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Whole eras of technical progress and economic growth appear to be driven by a few key
technologies, which we call General Purpose Technologies (GPT's). Thus the steam engine and
the electric motor may have played such a role in the past, whereas semiconductors and computers
may be doing as much in our era. GPT's are characterized by pervasiveness (they are used as
inputs by many downstream sectors), inherent potential for technical improvements, and
innovational complementarities', meaning that the productivity of R&D in downstream sectors
increases as a consequence of innovation in the GPT. Thus, as GPT's improve they spread
throughout the economy, bringing about generalized productivity gains.
Our analysis shows that the characteristics of GPT's imply a sort of increasing returns to scale
phenomenon, and that this may have a large role to play in determining the rate of technical
advance; on the other hand this phenomenon makes it difficult for a decentralized economy to fully
exploit the growth opportunities offered by evolving OPT'S. In particular,' if the relationship
between the OPT and its users is limited to arms-length market transactions, there will be "too
little, too late" innovation in both sectors. Likewise, difficulties in forecasting the technological
developments of the other side may lower the rate of technical advance of all sectors. Lastly, we
show that the analysis of GPT's has testable implications in the Context of R&D and productivity
equations, that can in piinciple be estimated.
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For over three decades now economists have knownthattechnical change is
the single most important force driving the secular process of economic growth
(Abramovitz, 1956, Solow, 1957). Yet, relatively little progress has been made
in unveiling the contents of the "residual" ofaggregateproduction
functions', or in characterizing as an economic phenomenon the notion of
technical change that underlies it. Key to this gap in our understanding is
the fact that technology itself (and its creation) remains by and large an
empty concept in economics: as far as our analytical models go there is really
no way to distinguish between, say, the advent of the microprocessor and the
introduction of yet another electronic gadget.
In stark contrast to such "black box" notion of technology, economic
historians emphasize the role played by some key technologies in the process
of growth, such as the steam engine, electricity, and semiconductors (see
Landes, 1969, Rosenberg, 1982). Anecdotal evidence aside, is there such a
thingas "technological prime-movers"? Could it be that a handful of
technologies had a dramatic impact on the growth potential of whole economies
overextended periods of time? What is there in the very nature (technological
and otherwise) of the steam engine, or the electric motor, or the silicon
wafer, that make them prime "suspects" of having played such & role?
In this paper we attempt to forge a link between the details of
individual technologies and the aggregate growth process. We put forward a
view of innovation and growth in which there are key technological facts that
may have far reaching consequences for the dynamic performance of the economy
as a whole. The central notion is that, at any point in time, there are a
handful of "generic", or "general purpose" technologies (GPT' s) characterized
by their pervasiveness (i.e. they can be used as inputs in a wide range of
downstreamsectors),and by their technological dynamism. Thus, as the GPT
evolves and advances, it spreads throughout the economy, and in so doing it
'See however Denison (1962), and the series of papers in Part II and Part
IV of Griliches (1988).-2-
brings about and fosters generalized productivity gains.2
The presumed role of OPT's as "prime-movers' stems primarily from the
workings of "innovational complementarities", meaning that the productivity of
R&Dina dovnstream sector increases as a consequence of innovation in the OPT
technology.3'4 Thus, for example, the productivity gains associated with the
introduction of electrical motors in manufacturing stew not only from reduced
energy costs, but from the fact that the new energy source allowed the much
more efficient (re)design of factories, taking advantage of the newfound
flexibility of electric power. Thus, innovational complementarities entail the
existence of a non-convexity in the underlying technology (a vertical
externality) that magnifies and helps propagate the effect of innovation in
the OPT. The sharing of the GPT among an increasing number of application
sectors represent a second externality (the horizontal one).
Clearly, these non-convexities may speed up growth, but quite likely not
up to the socially optimal rate. The reason is that they pose serious
coordination problems that cannot be easily resolved in a market context. This
is hardly surprising, since uncertainty and asymmetric information (which
typically make coordination difficult), are in the essence of the creation of
2Griliches (1957) relates to hybrid corn in terms that correspond closely
to our notion of general purpose technologies (in the context of agriculture):
"Hybrid corn was the invention of a method of inventing, a method of breeding
superior corn for specific localities." (p. 501; our emphasis). See also David
(1990) for a closely related view on the role of generic technologies.
'Ye ommit here two additional forces that are thought to play a similar
role: technological interrelatedness, and diffusion in conjunction with
leaning-by-doing. The first means that there is 'leaning by inventing': the
invention of a particular subtechnology in the context of a OPT lowers the
costs of inventing the next one, which in turn contributes to span other
subtechnologies further down the line. The second is more conventional: as the
number of downstream sectors using the OPT increases the costs of producing
the generalized input go downbecauseof'leaning-by-doing',thus
contributing to a self-sustained process of economy-wide growth.
41n defining innovational complementarities and understanding their role
we were strongly influencedbyRosenberg'sinsightful1979 essay,
"TechnologicalInterdependence in the American Economy," reproduced in
Rosenberg (1982)-3-
new knowledge (Arrow 1962). Iforeover, time gaps andtimesequences are an
inherent feature of technological development, particularly in the context of
GPT's (e.g. the transistor could not come before electricity, nor could
interferon before DNA), and hence what would be required is coordination
between agents located far from each other along the time and the technology
dimensions. However, where there is potential for coordination failures there
is also room for coordination, and which ultimately prevails depends upon the
institutional arrangements that are developed, alongside or in lieu of market
arrangements. Thus, looked from the vantage point of the evolution of GPT's,
growth is seen to depend critically on the industrial organization details of
a handful of markets, namely, those associated with the GPT.
A great deal of research has been done in recent years on the role of
increasing returns in endogenous growth (going back to Romer's 1986 seminal
contribution). However, many of these models regard the economy as "flat", in
that they do not allow for explicit interactions between different sectors.
Thus, the locus of technical change would not seem to matter, and hence there
is no room to discuss explicitly issues of coordination, market structure and
aggregate growth. Closely related, technical change is often assumed to be
all-pervasive, that is, to occur with similar intensity everywhere throughout
the economy. Clearly, one could not build a theory of growth that depends upon
the details of bilateral market relations, when those details could in
principle refer to any or all of the myriad of markets that make up the
economy. By contrast, we identify here a particular sector (the GPT prevalent
in each "era") that we regard as critical in fostering technical advance in a
widerange of user industries, and hence presumably in "driving" the growth of
the economy at large. The price that we pay though for the sharp focus is that
theanalysis is partial equilibrium, and hence the implications for aggregate
growth are drawn by induction, rather than by explicit modelling of the whole
economy.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section sets to characterize
more in detail what we mean by GPT's, and brings in as illustrations the case
of the steam engine and the electric motor (which deliver "continuous rotary-4-
motion"), and the case of electronic circuits, at the heart of which lies
"binary logic". In order to highlight the workings of the vertical and
horizontal externalities and their welfare implications, we begin by setting
up in section 3 a formal model of GPT and application sectors that takes place
in just "one-round", emphasizing the two-way appropriability problem that
arises in this context (and the associated bilateral moral hazard). In section
4 we present the dynamic model drawing in a straightforward manner from Maskin
and Tirole (1987) theory of dynamic oligopoly; we emphasize the role of
technological uncertainty about the "other side" (e.g. how much user sectors
know about fuure innovations in the GPT) in determining both the pace of
technical advance of the whole cluster, and the level of the long nm
equilibrium. The dynamic model provides also the framework for the discussion
of aggregate growth in section 5; short of a full fledge general equilibrium
analysis, we do a "rent accounting" exercise, that is, we compute the rents to
innovation generated as the CPT and the application sectors move step by step
towards a long run equilibrium. We then relate these to a more conventional
aggregate growth equation, and show how one could in principle estimate the
effects of innovational complementarities, and test some of the implications
of GPT's.
2. A Description of General Purpose Technologies
We think of the technologies prevalent in any given period as structured
in a hierarchicalpattern (i.e. as forming a sort of "technological tree"),
whichinthe simplest case would consist just of two levels: a handful of
"basic" technologies at the top (perhaps just one), and a large number of
product classes or sectors that make use of the former at the bottom. Those at
the top are characterized first of all by their general purposeness, that is,
by their performing some generic function that is vital to the functioning of
a large segment of existing or potential products and production systems. Such
a generic function would be, for example, "continuous rotary motion,"
performed at first by the steam engine and later on by electrical motors;
"binary logic" would the corresponding generic function for electronics, the
obvious candidate GPT of our times.-5-
Thesecond distinctive characteristic of GPT's is their technological
dynamism: continuous innovational efforts, as well as leaning, increase over
time the efficiency with which the generic function is performed. This may
show up as reductions in the price/performance ratio of the products, systems
or components in which the OPT is embodied, or as multidimensional qualitative
improvements in them. As a consequence, the costs of the downstream sectors
that use the OPT's as inputs are lowered, they may be able to develop better
products, and moreover, further sectors will find it profitable to adopt the
improved OPT, thus expanding the range of applications. Third and last, OPT's
are characterized by the existence of innovational complementarities with the
application sectors, in the sense that technical advances in the OPT make it
more profitable for its users to innovate, and vice versa.
Of course, the process of technical advance along a given technological
course will run at some point into steep diminishing returns, scientific
breakthroughs will open up new technological opportunities, and hence the
dominant OPT of the era will be eventually superseded. Thus, and in
Schumpeter's spirit, we can think of the evolution over tiae of GPT's as
spanning some sort of long technological waves.
2.1 lotary motion: the steam engine and electricity
The universal character of the OPT's of the first and second industrial
revolutions are relatively easy to grasp: by definition, 'work' involves the
transformation of energy (be it human, animal, fossil, electrical, or
nuclear), from one to the other of it various possible states, i.e. heat,
motion (displacement), light, etc. It so happens that the production of great
many goods involves, or could potentially be done, by the application of one
particular type of energy transformation, namely, that which results in
continuous rotary motion. That is precisely the generic function performed by
thesteamengine, and later on by the electric motor. However, itwas by no
means obvious that rotary motion would become a universal functionality: many
manual jobs (e.g. sewing, polishing, cutting) could hardly be seen ex-ante as
naturalcandidates for replacement by mechanical actions originating in
continuous rotary motion. Moreover, in many cases the substitution did not-6-
make economic sense until the steam engine, andthenthe electric motor, could
deliver such functionality at previously undreamt of, andcontinuously
improving, price/ performance ratios. Once that happened, great amountsof
ingenuity were expended making this functionality useful for a wide variety of
industrial sectors; of course, these activities were driven by innovational
complementarities.
The case of electric power provides a clear illustration of what these
complementarities are all about, and give a sense of their tremendous
importance in productivity growth. The first three decades of this century
witnessed a steady decline in the price of electric-generated power, and
constant improvements in the efficiency of electric motors. As a consequence,
electric motors diffused rapidly throughout manufacturing (displacing the
steam engine): whereas they accounted for less than 57. of installed horsepower
in the U.S. at the turn of the century, the percentage rose to over 807. by
1930. It is widely believed that the large productivity gains registered
during mostofthatperiod owe a great deal to this process of
electrification. The point, however, is that the contribution of the electric
motor to productivity growth goes far beyond the direct cost savings due to
the spread of a cheaper power source. In the words of Rosenberg (1982)
"The social payoff to electricity would have to include not only lower
energy and capital costs but also the benefits flowing from the newfound
freedom to redesign factories with a far more flexible power source.
the steam engine required clumsy belting and shafting techniques for the
transmission of power within the plant. These methods.. .imposed serious
constraints upon the organization and flow of work, which had to be
grouped, according to their power requirements, close to the energy
source Vith the advent of 'fractionalized' power made possible by
electricity and the electric motor, it now became possible to provide
power in very small, less costly units ...[this]flexibility ...made
possible a wholesale reorganization of work arrangements and, in this
way, made a wide and pervasive contribution to productivity growth
throughout manufacturing. ...Machinesand tools could now be put anywhere
efficiency dictated, not where belts and shafts could most easily reach
them." (pp. 77-78).
2.2 The 'era' of electronics
It is important to understand what 'general purposeness' means in the-7-
context of the dominant OPT of our times, namely, semiconductor technology.
Once again, there is a particular functionality at the heart of this OPT, in
this case binary logic. Its pervasiveness is now taken for granted, but the
wide-scale application of binary logic beyond computing per se was by no means
obvious until not long ago, and neither was the depth and breath of computing
itself. Some economic activities such as accounting (broadly understood) were
alreadyconceptualized as "computing" when the integrated circuit was
invented, and in fact automatic data processing in banking was one of the
earliest uses of mainframe computers;5 but who would have thought of say, the
carburetion of an automobile engine as "computing"?
What accounts then for the general purposeness of electronic circuits?
The workings of virtually any system and, in particular, of any electro-
mechanical system, can be thought of as (and actually be broken down into) a
series of steps that transform a given input into a desired outcome. Thus, a
traditional watch transforms the power of the spring into an analog signal,
depicting time; a washing machine transforms electrically-induced continuous
mechanical traction into a series of actions involving the movement of parts,
the opening and closing of valves, etc. Despite their variety, a vast majority
of these intervening steps can in principle be done (or be replicated) by the
application of binary logic, that is, by activating a circuit consisting of a
series of binary elements (e.g. gates, flip-flops, etc.). This is a striking
technological fact that has far reaching economic implications. What it says
is that the enormous variety of seemingly disparate products, materials,
methods of production, etc. conceal the uniformity of a few underlying
tecbnological principles; these principles, in turn, give rise to potent
economic forces that would shape the (endogenous) process of technical change.
Contrary to popular perceptions, substituting binary logic for mechanical
parts is in many cases extremely inefficient, if measured by the number of
Think of the development of transactions-processing software (which was
done mainly by the banking sector itself), and the associated chanes in the
operational procedures of the banks as complementary innovations, 'enabled by"
the OPT.-8-
steps required by the former, and hence by the number of circuit components
andoperationsinvolved. However, as the price andsizeof circuit components
decrease dramatically,and as their reliability improves, it becomes
eventually cost-effective to use them rather than the old electro-mechanical
parts. And, in turn, these dramatic advances in costs, size and reliability
are due to a large extent to the tremendous increases in the volume of
production of standardized circuits, where clearning plays a key role. It is
worth quoting extensively at this point from a classic textbookin
electronics:
"The ultimate in standardization is practical only with digital logic.
High-volume mechanical parts can be made very economically, such as the
$5 clock proves, but too many variations are possible.. .to achieve the
kind of standardization we now have in digital integrated circuits. Clock
gears, for example, can have any number of teeth and be any of an
infinite number of sizes.. .Vhich such a large selection, it is impossible
to produce standard gear components for general use in anywhere near the
required volume.. .Vith digital integrated circuits standardization is
easy. The logical equivalent of speed-reducing gear train in a clock is a
chain of identical, standard, flip-flops, each of which reduces the speed
by a factor of 2. These flip-flops areidenticalto the ones used in a
computer, a tape unit, or any other logic device [our emphasis] .. .Wethus
have the key to the digital takeover of the world: standardized bargain
components.. .The tremendous savingsfromusing the standardized
components more than offset the inefficiency of adapting the components
to the application." (Blakeslee, 1975, page 4).
Ye may add that, even if mechanical parts could be standardized as much
as integrated circuits, it is far from clear that the costs of producing them
would decline as a function of volume nearly as steeply: there is something in
the nature of the production process of integrated circuits that is highly
conducive to continuous 'learning effects' (i.e. batch and yield), but it is
hard to see what their counterpart would be in the production of e.g. gears.
Learning is just part of the story: independent scientific advances as
well as massive investments in purposive R&D have contributed as much to the
staggering pace of technical advance that has taken place in electronics in
the last four decades. Take for example the number of individual components
(e.g. transistors) that can be put on a single chip: in the early sixties an-9-
integrated circuit comprised just a handful of them, in the early eighties
there were over one hundred thousand, and by the early nineties the number of
components reached one million. Amazing as it sounds, the pace of advance
along this dimension seems to conform indeed with 'Moore's Law', which states
that the number of components that can be packed on a single chip would double
every year (and this has been occurring for over 25 years!).
Reflecting both the purely physical aspects of these advances, and the
extent of competition in semiconductors, the quality-adjusted prices of
electronic devices have been declining at an unparalleled rate. Thus, for
example, the price per kilohit of dynamic random access memories (one of the
most common electronic components), has declined from over four dollars in the
early seventies to less than one cent lately; in other words, a kilobit of
memory was 5,000 times more expensive 15 years ago than it is today. As a
consequence of these quantum jumps, a personal computer today is many times
more powerful and versatile than the first mainframe computers were. A simple
digital watch, that can be bought today for a few dollars, was altogether a
technological impossibility at the time when the Sputnik was launched. CT
scanners, requiring the collection, processing and visual display of millions
of pieces of information in a few seconds, are almost as much a commonplace in
hospitals today as x- rays were a generation ago.
Thus the dominant technology of our times exhibits very clearly the key
features of a GPT: first, it has proven to have the inherent potential for
persistentand manifold technical advances along its main performance
dimensions; and second, these advances impinge upon a wide rangeof
applicationswhich, coupled with complementary innovations by the user
sectors, have brought about a reshaping of the universe of goods and services
at our disposal.
3. A Single-Period Model of Gil and Application Sectors
We begin by modelling the interaction between the GPT and the AS's as a
one-shot game, whereby each sector takes the technology decisions of all
others as given. The main goal here is to highlight the workings of the two- 10-
typesof externalities, the vertical one (between the GPT and each application
sector), and the horizontal one (across application sectors), and to explore
their welfare consequences. We take up the dynamics in section 4, using as a
framework Maskin and Tirole (1987) theory of dynamic oligopoly. The dynamic
model will allow us to consider the effect of technological foresight on the
long term equilibrium and, by having an explicit sequence of alternate moves,
it leads quite naturally to growth.
As it turns out though the "static" case anylised in this section obtains
as the limit of the dynamic model when the discount factor goes to zero. This
can be interpreted in the present context as a case where each agent faces
extreme uncertainty regarding the technological developments of the other
players, and hence behaves as if he/she were myopic.
3.1 The Application Sectors
As suggested above, what characterizes a GPT is first of all its
generality of purpose, that is, the fact that it performs some generic
function that lies at the heart of very many actual or potential products and
production systems. As an illustration figure 1 shows some of the application
sectors (AS's henceforth) of the dominant GPT of our times, semiconductors:
the first transistors were incorporated in hearing aids, shortly after in
radios, then in television sets and computers; later on, the advent of the
microprocessor brought about an explosion of new uses which has not yet
abated. Many of these applications consist of entirely new products that were
made possible by powerful integrated circuits (e.g. personal computers, CT
scanners, camcorders), whereas others occurred in traditional products that
underwent a gradual transformation as they began to incorporate integrated
circuits (e.g. automobiles, civilian and military aircraft). Note that the
only shared feature of the AS's of a given GPT is the fact that they purchase
that GPT as an input, otherwise they may be as diverse as any sub-set of
sectors in the economy.
Soaewhat more formally, an application sector is defined here as one
that, (i) is an actual or potential user of the GPT as an input; (ii) can earn- 11-
positivereturns by engaging in R&D of its own; and (iii) the rents it earns
increase monotonically with the 'quality' of the GPT. The conditions that each
AS faces in the markets for its inputs and outputs determine its short run
equilibrium; we leave these in the background for now, and characterize the
behavior of an AS by the objective function that it acts as ifit maximizes,
(1) lax ra(w, z, Ta) -Ca(Ta)ya(, z),a A
Ta
wherew is the price and z the quality of the purchased GPT, Ta the
technological level of the AS itself (affecting the quality of the product it
sells, and/or the efficiency of its production process), Ca(.) the R&D
expenditures needed to reach the level Ta,6 ya(.) the gross payoff (or
"rents") to technical advance in the a sector, and A the set of all AS's.
For example, z would include the number of transistors, the speed
clock, and the word size of microprocessors used in micro-computers ("PC's"),
T would comprise effective computing speed and other performance indices of
PC's, and C&(T) the R&D expenditures of PC makers. Many of the examples that
come to mind suggest that both z and T are likely to be vectors of large
dimensions, and moreover, that many of their elements are not readily known or
easily assessed (let alone anticipated) by "outsiders" to the respective
sectors. While it does not matter for the formal analysis whether z and T
are scalars or vectors (and hence we treat them as scalars), the informational
structure may matter a great deal (see section 4).
From the above definitions it follows that ? >0,4> 0,and1a <
0;as usual in this type of models we assume C >0and CT >0.In
order to focus just on the vertical links between the AS and the GPT we
assume, first, that whatever the market conditions in which the AS operates,
changesin 1a are perfectly correlated with changes in social surplus; and
6This "cost-of-inventing" function may depend on z as well, but we
ignore such dependence here since it does not alter the analysis.- 12-
second,that Ta is the maximand regardless of the structure of control along
the vertical chain.7'8 These assumptions allow us to examine the whole
GPT/AS's cluster in terms of its efficiency at internalizing the externalities
associated with the GPT, while ignoring the peculiarities of each end-market.
Crucially, we assume the presence of 'innovational complementarities'
(henceforth just IC), formally defined as
Ta=82Ta(w,z,Ta) o
zTa Ox OTa
withstrict inequality holding when demand for the GPT input is strictly
positive. In words, the value to the AS of am additional dollar of own R&D
increaseswith the quality of the GPT input. Conversely, IC imply that a
marginal improvement in z will result in higher rents the more the AS firm




which implicitly defines the reaction function,
(3) Ta =Ra(z,v)
It is easy to show that Ra(.) will be upward sloping in z;9 thus, the AS
7Those are standard assumptions in theliterature onvertical
integration: see for example Hart (1988) and Bolton and Ihinston (1989).
8These conditions hold if, for example, the AS is perfectly competitive,
inwhich case 7astands for consumer surplus, that is, flisthe
equilibrium(gross)social payoff to technological advance.
OTa/Oz =raT7-(4 T
-
C.TowhereraT >0by the assumption Zaaaaa za
ofIC; the denominator is positive since second order conditions are assumed
to hold: we have assumed already that CT >0,and 4T <0requires- 13-
hasan incentive to increase its equilibrium technology level (and hence its
R&D spending) in response to a quality improvement in the CPT input. This is
one side of a sort of "dual inducement mechanism" mediated by IC.
Finally, we assume that for alt a >0and w c the ranking of AS's
according to Va(w, a) (see eq. 1) is the same, so that given a and w the
"marginal" AS is uniquely determined by the smallest Va(.) that fulfills
ya(w, a) ￿0.10Call this sector n, then n(w, a) is the largest number of
sectors that find it profitable to use the CPT as an input given w and a, and
A(w, a) the corresponding set of sectors. Note that since V(w, a) c 0 and
V(w, a) >0,then
(4) nw(w, a) < 0, na(w, a) > 0
A(w', z) cA(w,a) for w'w, and
A(w, a')A(w, a) for a' ￿ a.
that is, the set of using sectors expands as the quality of the CPT improves
and its price goes down.
3.2 The CIT Sector
Assuming that there is no product differentiation in the OPT sector (i.e.
that in every period it sets a single a, and hence a single w), gross
profits in this sector (gross of R&D costs) for any w and a are,
(w -c)E P(w, a, Ta)
aeA
where c is the (constant) marginal cost, and the demand function Xm(.)
stemming from the AS's is (by the derivative property), P(w, a, Ta) =
onlythat 7abestrictly concave.
'01n the context of a diffusion model, with the price/performance of the
OPT decreasing over time, this sector will be the last to adopt.- 14-
- r(w,z ,Ta).Once again, since we want to focus on the vertical links
between the GIl and the AS's, we ignore the internal structure of the OPT
sector and assume that it consists of a single producer, which may or may not
behave as a monopoly vis a vis the AS's. If it does then it sets price
according to,
wW(z, T, c) =argmax (w -c)E P(w, z, Ta)
w ad
where T (without the subscript a) stands for the vector of Ta's. The
restricted profit function is thus r5(z, T, c) (wm -c)S P(w", z, Ta),
aeA
and the behavior of the sector is characterized by,
Nez i-(z, T, c) -C5(z)
a
where C5(z) is the R&D function of the OPT (again, we assume >0 and
Cz >0).The FOC is simply,
(5) 1(z, T, c) a (wm-c) sxa(wm,z,Ta) =
whichdefines the reaction function,
(6) a R(T, c)
Notice that the optimal a is determined by the technological levels of all
AS's (T is a vector), and hence upgrades in the technology of any of the AS's
will induce an adjustment in the quality of the GPT according to,''
''Ye assume for simplicity that since there are many As's, each sector
does not take into account the effect of its technological upgrades on the
price of the OPT, that is, even though OXa/OTa0, in setting the optimal Ta
each AS behaves as if Ow(z,T,c)/?Ta =0;letting Ow/UTa >0does not change
the results, only complicates the analysis.- 15-
7
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Weassume that the innovational complementarities that are present in
ra(.)get transmitted to the demand function, so that >0 => ja>0, Za
and therefore =(w-c)1T > 0.12Assumingthat SOC hold the
denominator will be positive as well, andhence(7) will be positive, that is,
atechnological improvement in any ofthe user sectors will prompt the OPT
producerto engage in further R&D and upgrade the quality of the OPT. This is
then the second half of the dual inducement mechanism posited above, which is
mediated here by the demand function. Recalling that also1t >0,the
innovative activities of the OPT and of the AS can be characterized as
"strategic complements" (Bulow et al, 1985).
.1.3 The Decentralized Equilibrium versus the Social Optimum
Assumingthat the OPT and the AS's engage just in arms-length market
transactions(hence ruling out technological contracting and other forms of
cooperative links), we obtain the (decentralized) Nash equilibrium by solving




where for some AS's it may be that T =0.Typically there will be multiple
Nash equilibria (if the reaction functions are concave, there will be at least
two, a "low" and a "high"); moreover, one can always define constrained
l2Thiá is equivalent to assuming that changes in Tashift demand and
marginal revenue in the same direction, which ensures that even monopoly
pricin3 by the OPT will not prevent an upward sloping R5(Ta) function. More
competitive pricing behavior by the OPT sector would require a weaker
assumption.- 16-
equilibria,one for each subset A c A, where A is the set of all possible
AS's (participation lags or similar rigidities would maketheseequilibria
meaningful). The plausibility of alternative equilibria is an interesting
issue on its owo; however, here we are interested primarily in analyzing the
efficiency of different vertical arrangements vis a vis the social optimum,
andhenceforcomparison purposes we take the "best" decentralized
equilibrium, that is, the one associated with the largest A, denoted by A°,
whichwill be associated with the largest z° and T° by virtue of (4).
Now to the social optimum. First we impose marginal cost pricing (w =
whichimplies =0.For any A c A the social planner's problem is,
(8) lax {Era(c, z, Ta) -ECa(Ta) -C5(z)}aS(A)
z,Ta ad ad
rendering the FOC's,
(9) 4a(c,z,Ta) =C;(Ta), Va
(10) aeA r(c, z, Ta) =
whichimplicitly define in turn the 'socially optimal reaction functions',
(9)' Ta =P(z,c) Va
(10)' z =R(T)
**
Fora given A, the social optimum is the vector {z ,T}thatfulfills
=aa(z*,c)*Va,and z* =ag(T*)Finally, the social planner chooses




where 5(A) is defined in (8). Note that the marginal sector here is the one
with the smallest Va[c, R(T )]￿0.
Proposition I:
Assuming that r(-) ￿ aeAT and for any pricing rule wm w >c,the
social optimum entails higher technological levels than the decentralized
* * 0 *
equilibrium,that is,z >z°,Ta )TaVa, and A° c A
(the proof is in Appendix 1). The assumption that r(.) ￿ aeAT() deserves
some further elaboration: 4(.)isthe value of a quality increase for the
AS's at the margin, whereas a(AT() is the total valuation of a quality
upgrade. As in the case of the provision of quality by a monopoly (Spence,
1975) in all probability the two would not be the same, and that will lead to
a divergence between social and private optimality. Still, the inequality need
not be as assumed (it could go the other way around), but in the present
context it is arguably more plausible, since it implies that the proportion of
the surplus appropriated by the OPT sector does not increase with z.13
This granted, the reason for the divergence between the social optimum
and the decentralized equilibrium lies in the complementarities between the
two inventive activities, and the positive feedbacks that they generate. Thus,
starting from the social optimum{z ,Ta} and reasoning "backwards", each
player would want to innovate less: lowering z lowers each Ta (see eq. 3),
which in turn means less commercial opportunity for the OPT sector, and hence
lower z (we pretend that the adjustment takes place in a sequence of steps
just to illustrate the point). The effects of the participation decision by
applications sectors reinforces these tendencies: lower z means lower Ta's,
and as some turn negative for particular sectors, the set A shrinks. This
means that the market for the OPT shrinks, prompting a further cutback in z,
and hence in the Ta of those applications sectors that remain active.
'3Actually proposition 1 may hold even if the inequality is reversed, but
we have not been able to characterize the range of cases for which that is so.- 18-
Itis important to note that the assumption of monopoly pricing by the
GPT is not the villain, as can be seen by considering alternative pricing
mechanisms to get a better outcome. First, pick a pricing rule that gives the
AS's the right incentives to innovate: the only such rule is w =c, which
leads to no appropriability and thus no innovation in the GPT. Second, attempt
to pick a pricing rule that gives the GPT the social rate of return to
innovation. Clearly, no singlew(.) would suffice, only the perfectly
price-discriminating GPT monopolist would earn the social return, but that
would leave zero returns to technical advance in the AS's. A fully specified
technology contract could probably solve the problem (provided that it is
binding, a big "if"), but that just underlines the point made here, namely,
that any arms-length market mechanism under innovational complementarities
necessarily entails private returns that fall short of social returns for
either upstream or downstream innovations, under all plausible pricing rules.
3.4 The Vertical and lorizontal Externalities
As already suggested, the feedback machanism leading to social rates of
return greater than private ones reflects two fundamental externalities. The
firstis vertical, linking the payoffs of the inventors of the two
complementary assets, and follows from innovational complementarities. The
secondishorizontal, linking the interests of players in different
application sectors, and is an immediate consequence of generality of purpose.
The vertical externality is closely related to the familiar problem of
appropriability, except that here it runs both ways, and hence corresponds to
a bilateral moral hazard problem (Holmstrom, 1982, Tirole, 1988). Firms in any
AS and the UPT sector have linked payoffs; the upstream firm would innovate
only if there is a mechanism (involving w >c)that allows it to appropriate
some of the social returns. The trouble is that any w >cimplies that the
private incentive for downstream innovation is too low. For appropriability in
the familiar range itis clear that neither side will have sufficient
incentives to innovate.
Recently, several scholars as well as industry advocates have suggested19 -
broad-basedchanges in government policy to increase appropriability in
sectors that would qualify as GPT's (primarily semiconductors). Typically,
these policy initiatives concern intellectual property protection, limits on
foreign competition, and the relaxation of antitrust standards for these
sectors. What our analysis suggest is that policy measures of this nature
cannot be sensibly evaluated in isolation, since they would change the
incentive to innovate in the GPT sector, and they would change the returns to
complementary investments made by users of the GPT throughout the economy.
What is required is a close examination of the feedbacks and tradeoffs
involved, and of the comparative statics of the system as a whole.
The second externality stems from the generality of purpose of the GPT.
From the vantage point of the OPT the AS's represent commercial opportunity;
thus, the more AS's there are, and the larger their demands, the faster will
be the rate of change in the GPT technology. From the point of view of the
AS's, expanding the set A, raising Ta for any AS, or making anAS more
willing to pay for the OPT makes all of the other AS's better off, by raising
z. Yet in equilibrium each AS finds itself with too few parallel sectors, each
innovating too little.'4 The point is that, from their perspective, zis a
public good while jg is the (common) fixed cost needed to produce that good;
however, attempts to cover such costs with transfer prices impose a tax that
discourages innovation.
The horizontal externality can illuminate some issues in the economics of
technology connected with the role of large, predictable demanders, which are
in turn related to policy. It is often claimed that the procurement policy of
the U.S. Defense Department "built" the microelectronics-based portion of the
electronics industry in the US during the fifties and sixties. Obviously, the
presence of a large demander changes the conditions of supply, and this may
benefit other demanders. However, the important point here is that such a
'4Note that this issue arises above and beyond the multiple equilibrium
problem, since we have assumed that the "best" Nash equilibrium is the one
that holds; in particular, the economy is not trapped at z=O, T=Oby a
failure to realize mutually profitable opportunities.- 20-
demanderhad a high willingness to pay for components embodying z well
outside current technical capabilities, and was willing to shoulder part of
the risk, primarily by procurement assurances; in so doing it may have indeed
set in motion (and sustained for a while) the virtuous cycle mediated by the
horizontal externality.
However, it is only a coincidence that the horizontal spillouts came from
the demand activity of a government entity: in the same technology, large
private demanders such as the Bell System and IBM, contributed directly to the
development of fundamental advances in microelectronics. EarlierGPT's
displayed similar patterns, as for example in Rosenberg's (1982) description
of the importance of improvements in the quality of materials for 19th century
U.S. growth: much of the private return to improvements in material sciences
(and engineering) came from a few key sectors, notably transportation. The
need to build steel rails for the railroad, and to contain steam in both
railroads and steamships, provided a kind of demand parallel to that of the
government body noted above. Focused on improvements in inputs that press the
technical envelope, having high willingness to pay because they themselves are
making changes which are large relative to the size of the economy, such
demanders provide substantial horizontal spillouts to the extent that the
technical progress they induce is generally useful.
These examples seem to suggest that the "triggers" often take the form of
exogenous forces that shift the rate of return to GPT technology. Thus in the
19th century the importance of certain sectors (e.g. transportation) as driven
by the economic development of the country may have been the key. In the post
V12 era the onset of the cold war, and the "social contract" implied by the
government procurement policy that followed may have played a similar role. In
each case, the positive feedback aspects of GPT and related AS developments
then took over, generating very large external effects, and unleashing a
process that played out for decades.
3.5 Externalities and Zechnological Contracting
Clearly, the vertical and horizontal externalities offer a strong motive- 21-
forbreaking away from the limitations of arms-length market transactions, by
increasing the degree of cooperation and explicit contracting between As's and
theGPT, andbetweenthe AS's themselves. To illustrate, consider the case
whereby anytwoagents canforman arbitrary, binding technology contract, be
it the GPT sector andanAS, or a pair of AS's. It is easy to see that in the
former case they will pickz andTato maximize (ra+is); inthe
latter, they will pick the two Ta's to maximize the sumofthe two
applications sectors' payoffs. The result of either such contract will be that
z and Ta will be larger for all applications sectors: the set A can
expand as a consequence of the contract, but not shrink. Payoffs will be
larger for the GPT sector, and for all AS's not party to the contract as well.
Note however that the activity of forming binding technology contracts is
subject to the sane externality as the provision of technology itself. Just as
every AS would like to see other AS's advancing their own technology, so too
would each sector like to see others making technology-development contracts
with the GPT. Clearly, lack of enforceability, as well as imperfect technology
forecasting may seriously limit the practical importance of contracting.
Recent events in the computer and telecommunications markets show how
pervasive yet complex the motive for technological cooperation can be. For a
long period, each market was characterized by the presence of a dominant firm
(IBM and AT&T), which could take a leading role in the determination not only
of its owntechnology,but in the encouragement of complementary developments
in or for applications. The changing conditions of competition in both markets
have removed the obvious enforcer of implicit technology contracts. Now,
technical progress in the GPT part of both computing and telecommunications is
diffused across quite a few firms, and the mechanisms for technology
contracting have changed accordingly. "Strategic alliances," participation in
formal standards-setting processes, consortia, software "missionaries," and
the systematic manipulation of the trade press, have all emerged as standard
management tools in microelectronics-based industries. These mechanisms permit
both revelation of the likely direction of technical advance within particular
technologies, and encouragement of complementary innovations. Yetthey
probably fall short of offering the means to internalize the bulk of the- 22-
externalitiesdiscussed above.
4. The Dynamics of General Purpose Technologies
In previous sections we assumed that the whole process takes place in
just "one round", and that allowed us to discuss the two main externalities
associated with GPT's in a relatively simple fashion. However, in order to
examine the implications of GPT's for growth, we need to formulate explicitly
a dynamic process by which the innovational efforts of the GPT andtheAS's
unfold andinteractover time. A suitable framework for that purpose is the
theory of dynamic oligopoly as developed by Afaskin and Tirole (1987)
(henceforthM&T), which centers around the concept of Markov Perfect
Equilibrium (EPE). In what follows we sketch the model and (re)state the main
results from M&T in terms of GPT's and AS's;
Denote by ra(z, Tt) the instantaneous profit function of the AS, and
by rH(zt, Tt) that of the GPT (for simplicity we assume that w is fixed).
The GPT and the AS are assumed to move in alternate periods of fixed lenght r,
which in the present context has a natural interpretation, namely, it is the
lenght of time it takes to develop the "next generation" (either of the GPT or
of the AS) ,giventhat the other side has already developed its current
technology. Thus, the quality level of the GPT at time t-1 is z1, and it
remains constant for the next two periods (i.e. for a lenght of time of 2r).
Givenztlit takes the AS r to develop its technology up to level Tt,
and once that has materialized it takes again r for the GPT to develop its
next generation, which will be marketed in period t+1 and will exhibit
quality zt÷1. Ye refer for simplicitly to the AS but actually we mean all
AS's, which are assumed to move simultaneously every other period. Thus we
abstract from the process of diffusion of the GPT among AS's, but otherwise
the analysis is the same whether the side interacting with the GPT is made up
of one or many sectors.
An obvious difference between this and the original MkT's formulation is- 23-
thatin here the firms involved are not oligopolists competing in the same
market; they are instead vertically related, with their innovational efforts
being "strategic complements". However, from a formal point of view that is
just a technicality: what counts is that the cross derivatives of the payoff
functions of all players do not vanish. Notice also that whereas in the
original oligopoly context the assumption of a sequence of alternate moves
(and consequent two-period commitments) constitutes an awkard feature that is
not easy to justify, in the present context it is a natural modelling scheme
that stems at least to some extent from technological imperatives.
At time t each firm maximizes,t5
(11) s:o 5ri(z Tt+5), i= a, g
where5 =exp (-rr)is the discount factor, and r the interest rate.
Define a dynamic reaction function for farkov strategies (i.e. dependant only
on the payoff-relevant state and not on history) for the AS as Tt =
andsimilarly for the GPT, zt =Ita(T The pair (P, R) form a MPE
iff there exist valuation functions (V1, V'), i=a,g, such that (for the AS),
ya(z) =max[rZ(z, T) +5V(T)]
P(z) maximizes [ra(z,T)+SV(T)]
W(T) =ra[Rg(T)T] +SV&[R(T)]
and similarly for the GPT. It is easy to show that the reaction functions will
be in this case upward sloping, since the cross-derivates of the r1's,
are positive (because of innovational complementarities).
ttWe abstract for the time being from the cost side, since its inclusion
does not affect the substance of the analysis. Development costs correspond
here to what M&T refer to as "adjustment costs" (of changing outputs in their
context) -seesection 5.- 24-
M&Tprove that, for any discount factor 5,(a) there exists a unique
linear hEFT which is dynamically stable; and (b) the equilibrium (steady state)
values of the decision variables(Ze, Te) equal the static Cournot-Nash
equilibrium when S =0,and grow with 5. An equivalent way of phrasing (b)
is that the (dynamic) reaction functions coincide with their static (Cournot)
counterparts as 5 goes to zero.16
This proposition has highly revealing implications in our context. The
discount factor 5 can be interpreted here as a measure of the difficulty in
forecasting the technological developments of the other side: the smaller 5
is, the more difficult it is for the AS to anticipate the future qualities of
the GPT, and viceversa.17 Technological forecasting, in turn, depends upon a
variety of institutional arrangements that may facilitate or hinder the flow
of credible technological information between the Gil and the AS's. Thus, part
(b) of the proposition implies that such arrangements may have far reaching
consequences for the actual innovational efforts of the sectors involved: the
more "cooperative" they are in terms of informational exchanges, the higher
the ultimate equilibrium levels (Ze, Te) will be, and moreover, the larger
the values {zt, Tt} will be at each step in the sequence leading towards the
steady state (see Figure 2). Larger values at each step will translate in turn
into faster aggregate growth, provided that in the process the GPT diffuses
throughtout a large number of sectors (see next section).
In the limit (5 =0),it is altogether impossible for any player to
forecast the next technological developments of the others, and hence it will
have no choice but to behave as if it were myopic, that is, to decide on each
move assuming as it were that the others will stay put. In other words,
sophisticated forward looking planning coupled with extreme uncertainty is
indistinguishable behaviorally fron shortsightedness with or without complete
16h1&T provetheproposition for the special case of quadratic profit
functions;Dana and Montrucchio (1986) generalized the proof for any concave
payoff function; see also Dana and hIontrucchio (1987).
lTThisis of course a shortcut to the explicit modelling of technological
uncertainty, which would involve games of incomplete information.- 25-
information.Thus, the (static) Cournot-like reaction functions can be seen in
this context as generating an actual sequence of moves, that cannot be
dispensed of with the traditional argument of inconsistensy. This is a very
useful feature, since in the present context it is easy to derive Cournot
reaction functions for virtually any payoff functions.
As suggested above the point is that 5 is not to be taken as a given,
but rather it is a function of the industrial organization features of the
market for the GPT. One way to think of it is as follows: suppose that r is
the required overall development time of each "new generation" of both the GPT
and the AS;tS however, assume now that a proportion (1 -0)of the
development can be done before the other side has completed its development
(which implies of course that a proportion 0 has to be done afterwards).
Thus, for example, firms developing new personal computers know that the next
generation of Intel's microprocessors is going to be the 586, that it is due
in late 1992, that it is expected to have 2 million transistors and at least
twice the 486's performance (see table 1). On that basis they maybe able to
do part of the R&D for the next generation of personal computers that will
incorporate the 586, but not all: some of the development process requires
that they actually get hands on the 586, examine it, test it in various
configurations, etc. How much they can develop prior to the actual appearance
of the 586 depends inter alia upon the degree of detail of the technological
information that they manage to obtain, the extent to which Intel is willing
to make them privy of the development process, etc.
The reverse conditioning is perhaps less obvious but not less important:
to continue with the same example, Intel has been developing parts and
circuits for personal computers (other than microprocessors) even though
"neither line is profitable as chips, but through them Intel gains insight
into trends: Knowing what needs to go on a board this year helps it determine
what should go into microprocessors next year" (Business Veek, April 29, 1991,
l8The period lengthr can also be endogenized, i.e. it can be made a
function of R&D, a strategic variable; one can easily allow also for
differences in r across sectors.- 26-
page55). This is true to various degrees as one goes down the "technological
tree": thus, software developers need to actually have the new operating
systems in order to develop software for them; in order to write new operating
systems one needs to get hands on the (new) personal computers that will be
use them, and so forth.
Thus, the "effective" lenght of a period for our purposes (i.e. for eq.
11) isr SOr.We think of U as having an upper and a lower bound: if the
relationshipbetween the GPT and the AS takes the form of arms- lenght market
transactions, with no coordination of any kind between them (i.e. no intended
exchange of technological information), then 0=ii,whichcan as well be
normalizedto 1. On the other hand, if theindustrial organization features of
thesesectors are such that all technologically relevant information flows
freely between the two players, then 0 =P(we conjecture that 0 >0,but
that's a detail). There is therefore a range 0￿ ￿ 1? that maps a
corresponding institutional/organizational spectrum; moreover, collective
action presumably can change the prevailing 0, thus affecting the present and
future pace of innovation.
Clearly, the scope for coordination in the above sense increases with the
number and range of AS's (and so does the loss in a case of failure to
coordinate). Thus for example an improvement in the abilityofthe
microcomputer industry to forecast technological advances in microprocessors
may speed up the use of microlectronics in cars, hence foster larger
improvements in cars themselves, stimulate the demand for chips and hence
encourage their further development, and so forth.
5. Superadditivity and Growth
So far the analysis has been partial equilibrium, and we intend to keep
it that way. Nevertheless, one can examine the impact of GPT's on aggregate
growth (albeit in a limited fashion), by looking at the rents generated along
the process leading to a long-run Markov Perfect Equilibrium. The idea is
simply that growth can be thought of as a process of rent creation (that is,- 27-
asa process generating ever increasing total returns to factors), andhence
onecan lean about the rate of growth of alternative regimes by examining the
flow of rents under each regime. That is, we will do partial equilibrium rent
accounting, ratherthan themore conventional general equilibrium growth
accounting.
Recallthat it is the generality of purpose of the GPT that allows us to
talk about aggregate growth in this context: the leading GPT of each "era"
eventually diffuses through a very large number of AS's andspansnew ones, so
thatthe [GPT/AS's] cluster ends up accounting for a large portion of the
economy as a whole. Thus, the aggregate rate of growth, and the extent of the
concomitant rent-creation will depend on the rate of advance in a and on the
complementary innovational efforts by the AS's. As suggested above, these in
turn may well hinge on how well the UPT sector and the AS's manage to
"coordinate" their innovational plans, in the sense of devising mechanisms to
facilitate the flow of technological information and forecasts between them.
Let us examine now the magnitude of the rents generated as the process
unfolds. Suppose that an external shock affects favorably the GPT sector (e.g.
an exogenous innovation that lowers the costs of upgrading a), disturbing the
present equilibrium and triggering a sequential adjustment process that will
lead to a new and higher MPE.19 Consider the first two steps of the sequence:
at first the GPT producer increases its quality by Az, and then each AS
upgrades its technology by AT =P(z+Az)
-Ra(z).The (gross) incremental
rents to the GPT consist of the sum of three parts (we do it for the moment
just for one AS):
'5Suppose that the dynamic reaction function of each sector is also a
functionof a random variable wj, with8R1/Owj> 0, i=g,aeA. For i=ai
the(starting)equilibrium is {z0, T0}; at t=0 an external shock occurs to
say, the GPT, such that w > w. The first step in the sequence leading to a
new equilibrium will be z1R(TO, w), followed by T2 =P(z1,&),andso
forth.- 28
(i) Direct own effect:20
z÷Az
J T:(v, T) dv a 4Am
(ii) Feedback effect ("demand spillout"):
rT+AT
4(z, u) du m 4 AT
T
(iii) Joint effects arising from IC's ("super-additivity"):
T÷AT z+Az
JT J TZT(v,
u)dv du m tzT Am AT
The incremental rents to the AS can be decomposed in a similar fashion,
that is, (i)' direct own effect: 4 AT, (ii)' feedback effect ("pecuniary
externality"): 4 Az , and (iii)' joint effects arising from IC's
("super-additivity"): 4T Az AT. Substracting the R&D expenditures of each
sector (C5 for the GPT and for the AS), we can write the total net




(12) Ali= [7Az÷ 4ATJ + 4AT + raAz + T1) AzAT- C5- C8
spit
super- additivity
In order to express these rents in terms that translate more readily into
empirical categories, we assume that the "innovation function" for the GPT
The derivatives in the expressions of the form 4Aj(1 =g,a,j z,T)
should be understood as average derivatives over the relevant range (e.g.
z+Az), and likewise for AzAT.- 29-
sector(i.e. the inverse of the R&D-cost function C5(z) )takesthe form,
(13) =p(C)+
where C are the RIcO expenditures in period t (we associate each "step" in
the sequence with a time period), and similarly for the AS sectors, T =
Ø(C)+ We can then write2'
=(O/OC5).C5
and the same for the AS, 4•ATa =(ora/oCa).Ca.Thus, the components of
(12) can be written as follows (this time for all AS's),
(i) direct own returns: [(O?/0C5) -1]c5+YacA[(0hI)- 1]ca
(ii)spillovers: (os/oCa) Ca + (O a/DCS) Cs
(iii) super-additivity: a,A[(O2ra/ 8C 8) + (8275/ DCt 8C)] Ca ;5
Ina competitive economy we would expect (i) to be about the same as the
return to other investments; on the other hand, the rents stemming from the
21}'rom (13) it follows that Az =(C),and AT,= Ø(C); for example,
Az =(C)'/2(or, more generally, [C]5, ad), in which case we get the
adjustment costs model as in Masking and Tiro4 (1987). In equilibrium C =0
(which is the baseline), and hence AC =C.Thus,Az= (8z/8C).C, and
AT, =(8T/8C).C.Writing the payoff functions as r'[z,(C, z,,),
T,(C, T,3],i=a,g, we get: (875/Oz).Azt = andsimilarly
for the AS, 8r'/eT).AT =(Ort/DC).C.- 30-
externalities(ii)and(iii)maybe of any size, depending both on purely
technological factors (e.g the strenght of IC), and on institutional and
behavioral factors, which determine the steepness of the dynamic reaction
functions, and hence the magnitude of each "step" along the adjustment path.
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Suppose that the AS's can be aggregated, in the sense that a =A+
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In order to link these rent increments to a conventional growth
framework, consider Griliches' (1973) formula for total factor productivity
growth:
f =A+
whereA is the rate of autonomous technical change,kis the rate of
growth of the stock of knowledge IC, and a is the marginal product of I.
This can also be written as f =A+pRD/Q,where p is the rate of return
to R&D, RD is net aggregate investment in R&D, and Qtotaloutput.- 31-
Clearly,All as written in (13) is equivalent to p10, and therefore the rate
of productivity growth at time t can be expressed as t =f(A,Alit). Putting





which is in priciple an estimable equation, that may allow us to test some of
the empirical implications of OPT's. First, note that fig comprises the net
return to own R&D that accrues to the OPT producer, plus the sum of the
pecuniary externalities bestowed on all AS's. On the other hand, A includes
the return to own R&D accruing to the average AS, plus the average spillout
from AS's to the GPT (due to the fact that upgrading the technology of any AS
increases the demand for the OPT). Thus, we expect that fig >>A'that is, a
dollar of R&D spent in the OPT sector would hring in equilibrium higher total
returns than a dollar spent in any particular application sector. If so,
aggregate productivity growth would no longer depend upon aggregate R&D (as in
the traditional framework) but upon the distribution of R&D between the OPT
and the AS's.23
Second, notice that gA is a measure of the strenght of innovational
complementarities, and hence the force driving the endogenous growth process.
Thus if GPT's work as posited here we would expect that gA >o Moreover,in
the course of a "OPT era" we would expect g& to be higher at first, and to
decline in later stages; in fact, the shrinking of gA is what should herald
the end of the role of the OPT as an "engine of growth" in its era.
22For a related empirical study of R&D spillovers see Jaffe (1986); see
also Oriliches (1991) for a comprehensive survey of related work.
231t may also depend upon the distribution of R&D across the AS's
themselves, if these cannot be aggregated as done above.- 32-
Fromanother angle, if (14) could be estimated for a cross section of
countries one could in principle test the hypothesis that more cooperation
and/or better mechanisms for the transmision of technological information
implies both larger fl's and higher levels of R&D spending, and therefore a
positive correlation between the two.
6. Concluding Remarks
Our analysis shows that the characteristics of OPT's imply a sort of
increasing returns to scale phenomenon, and that this may have an important
role to play in determining the rate of technical advance, and hence the rate
of growth of the whole economy. On the other hand this phenomenon makes it
difficultfor a decentralizedeconomy to fully exploit the growth
opportunities offered by evolving OPT's. In particular, if the relationship
betweentheOPT and its users is limited to arms-lenghtmarket transactions,
therewill be "too little, too late" innovation in both the OPT and the
application sectors. Likewise, difficulties in forecasting the technological
developments of the other side may lower the rate of technical advance of all
sectors.Lastly, we show that the analysis of OPT's has testable implications
in the context of R&D and productivity equations, that can in principle be
estimated.
In future work we intend to follow several tracks: first, we would like
to do econometric work at the aggregate level as outlined in section 5; aside
fromsome challenging data problems (e.g. how to identify all or most of the
AS's, and obtain data on their R&D?) this wouldrequire a much tighter
formulationof the equations to be estimated, clarifying at the same time how
they relate to more conventional studiesof R&D spillovers. Second, we would
liketo do micro-level studies,aimed at estimating "technological value
added": how much of the gains from innovation registered in markets for final
products (i.e. the markets for the AS's) are "due to" technological advances
in the AS's themselves, as opposed to stemming from innovations in the OPT
incorporated in the AS's; in our notation the issue is estimating and
comparing r versus 4.Yehave collected extensive data on microcomputers,- 33-
whichmay allow us to carry out this type of study.
Third, historical studies of GPT's and "institutions" (in the hroad
sense): the intention would be to examine the historical evolution of
particular GPT's and of the institutions coupled with them, using our
conceptual framework in trying to understand their joint dynamics. In
particular, we would like to assess the extent to which specific institutions
facilitated or hindered the Gil's in playing out their presumed roles as
"engines of growth". A key hypothesis is that institutions display much more
inertia than leading technologies, and hence as a GPT era comes to a close and
new GPT's emerge, an economy may "get stuck" with the wrong institutions, that
is, those that enable the previous Gil to advance and carry the AS's, but that
may prove inadequate to do as much for the new GPT.
To sum up, the main goal of this paper has been to suggest a way of
thinking about technical change, that focuses on the interface between the
characteristics of key technologies and the features of the markets for them.
It is thus an attempt to look carefully inside the "black box" of technology,
inspired by history and aided by formal modelling, while seeking to unveil the
linksbetweenthe stylized facts of technology and the institutions
surrounding it. Since at any point in time there are countless "technologies",
this approach is useful only in so far as it can identify at the outset a
small subset of technologies that are of particular economic relevance, and
characterize them tightly. The notion of general purpose technologies put
forward here fulfills that role, but that is certainly just one possible
abstraction in this vein, there may be other interesting and useful
characterizations as well.- 34-
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Appendix1: Proof of Proposition 1
Compare eqs. (2) and (9), which correspond to an AS's private and social
equilibrium conditions respectively:
(2) 4(w, z, Ta) =CL(Ta)
(9) TT(c,z,Ta) =Ca(Ta)
The two equations are identical, except for the fact that w >c,and hence
the LES of (2) is smaller than the LIIS of (9), since by assumption X.
=
> 0.Thus, Ra(z, w) c Ra(z, c) =Ra(z,c) for all z, and in
particular,
(Al) Ta a Ra(z*,w) < ga(j, c) =
Considernow the FOC for private (eq. 5) and social (eq. 10) optimum in
setting z,
(5) r(z, T, c) a (w-c)EX(wm,z,Ta) =C(z)
(10) acA' z, Ta) =
TheLBS of both is the sane, but the LBS of (6) is smaller than that of (10)
by assumption. Thus, R(T) <R(T)for all T and, in particular
* -* *
(A2) z' a R(T )cR(T )= z
*
Clearly, zcannot be part of a decentralized equilibrium (BE) since that
requires it to be a fixed point, whereas by (Al) and (A2) z <R5[Ra(z],and
similarly for T .Relyingon the same argument one can show that {z', T'}
cannot be a BE either. Assuming that SOC hold for the BE and hence that- 37-
< l/R<1, then is clear that if {z°, T°}
Rs[fta(zo)] <z'<z,andlikewise Ta =Ra[Rs(Ta)]< Ta
equilibrium number of sectors, it is clear from (4) that
no =n[w,R5(T°)] and hence A° c A (strict inequalites






will hold if thereFigure 1
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AS1 AS2 AS3 ASa
Max r(w, z, Ta) -ca(Ta)
Ta
Notation:
GPT: General Purpose Technology
ASa: Application Sector a
"Quality" of the GPT
Market price of the GPT
c: Marginal cost of GPT
Ta: Technological level (or "performance") of ASa (T:. vector of f's)
ga
w ,r: Gross rents of the ith sector, 1: GPT, ASa


















Succesive Generations of a GPT: Actual andExpected
INTEL'SMICROPROCESSOR DYNASTY
'Chip Inkoduced .
8086/80881978/1979The chips that powered the first IBM PCt and PC
clones. They crunch numbers in l6-bt chunIc bul
'hove himitdlions fl Use of comput mémoPy
80286 1982 Speedier than the 8088/8086. Ike 80286 also
enabled computers to run far larger progrom.
First appeared on the 1984 IBM Pc/At
80306 1985 First Intel 32-bit mkroprocessor, capable of pro-
cessing data in 32-bit chunks. Gave PCs power to
do bigger jobs, like running networks
803865X1988 Lower-priced verión or the 80386, aimed at ki,I-
ing off the 80286, which was also produced by
Advanced Micro Devices
80486 1989 tnteI' "mainframe on a chip." With 142 hilllion
transislors, II one f the most complex hIp4
ever mode
486SX 1991 The chip aimed at bringing mainframe poWer to
the mosses. It will eventually make the 80386
obsolete
586 1992 Expected 10 have 2 rriillion transistors and at teat
twice the 80486's performance. Its missIon! ho
compete with RISC chips
686 1993/1994Just entering the development phase, the 686 is
likely to include sound and video-processing fea-
tures for "multimedia"
DATA, OW
Reproduced from Business Week, April 29, 1991, page 55.